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Abstract
We consider an extension of the standard Rubinstein model where both players are randomly
allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of known
value. We show that, when the value of the outside opportunities is of intermediate size, there
exist a  continuum  of  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  outcomes,  including  some  with  delayed
agreements.  Considering outside opportunities  of  significant  value,  we  prove  that  efficient
delays arise caused by the bargainers' aspirations in waiting for their outside option rather than
by threats. Moreover, if taking the outside option decreases the probability that the opponent
receives an outside option in the future, then it is possible that exactly two equilibrium payoffs
coexist. In this latter case, inefficiencies may be created by agreeing too early.
JEL Classification Number: C78
Key words: bargaining, outside options.
                                                
* Ponsatí acknowledges support from Spanish Ministry of Education through project PB-96-1192 and the
Government of Catalonia through project SGR-96-75. Sákovics acknowledges support from the HCM program
of the European Comision through contract CHRX-CT94-0489 "Games and Markets" and from Spanish
Ministry of Education through project PB-93-0679.2
1. Introduction
We study bilateral negotiations where both parties have outside options. We give a complete
characterization of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) under different scenarios. First,
we review results under the assumption that the options are always available and then we extend
the analysis to the case where options arise at random. With fixed known options, when their
value is small (even zero) there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes,
including  some  with  significant  delay. We  show  that qualitatively  similar  results  hold  for
random options of small value. On the other hand, for options of significant value delay may
arise caused by the bargainers' aspirations in waiting for their outside option to become available
rather than by threats. Moreover, if taking the outside option decreases the probability that the
opponent receives an outside option in the future, then it is possible that  two stationary  (!)
equilibria coexist.
In  a  strategic  analysis,  it  is  most  important  whether  players  can  obtain  their
"disagreement payoff" voluntarily or only in case of an exogenous breakdown of negotiations.
That is why outside options cannot be regarded as a disagreement point is used in the axiomatic
approach, and their effects have to be studied explicitly in the non-cooperative framework. All
the initial work on incorporating outside options to non-cooperative bargaining theory assumed
that if a player had the opportunity to take up an outside option she could do so only after she
rejected the proposal of her opponent. In this case, if this responder's option is larger than her
equilibrium share in the game without the possibility to opt out, there is a unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium, in which the player who has the option obtains a payoff equal to the value of
her option. Otherwise, the option has no effect on the outcome (the Outside Option Principle,
see Shaked and Sutton [1984]). It was Shaked [1994] who recognized that the assumption that
only the responder can opt out is not without loss of generality. In fact, if it is the proposer who
can threaten to take his outside option, the strategic consequences are markedly different. This is
so, because as long as his threat is credible (that is, his outside option exceeds his continuation
value in case he does not leave the game) he can appropriate the entire surplus, by making a
take-it-or-leave-it offer. As Shaked shows (see also Osborne and Rubinstein [1990]), when one
of the players may take up his option in the periods where he is the proposer, there exist a range
of outside options (strictly between zero and one) for which there exist multiple equilibria.
In a bargaining situation which is symmetric -- in the sense that both parties can make
proposals -- we find it more realistic  that both  players be  offered to  voluntarily  break off
negotiations. Moreover, considering uncertainty about the outside options is a natural extension
to the literature that deserves attention. We have shown elsewhere (Ponsatí and Sákovics [1998])
that moving from one-sided to two-sided outside options has important effects. For example, if3
players are allowed to walk away from negotiations (and commit to not coming back) then, even
if they have no valuable outside option, a continuum of equilibria  exist,  and  as  the players
become patient any division is possible in equilibrium. In this paper we combine that result with
uncertainty about the availability of options, yielding a more complete analysis.
When options come and go, the question of their availability becomes an issue to be
further clarified. For example, when a player without an option currently available is left without
a bargaining partner because her opponent opts out, it is not necessarily the case that the player
herself is left with a zero expected payoff, since she can still wait for her option to materialize in
the future. On  the other  hand,  we  assume  away  the  possibility  that  a  player  leaves  the
negotiations in exchange for a future outside option. We do this for expositional clarity, and
based on the fact waiting for the option to appear without breaking up the negotiation is weakly
dominant.
In our model, there is a stationary stochastic process which controls which combination
of the players has an option available, in each period of an alternating offer bargaining game.
Thus, bargaining takes place in four different states,1 (x, x), (ø, x), (x, ø) and (ø, ø). In each of
these states the equilibrium behavior of the players is different, reflecting the fact that they have
different actions available to them. Consequently, unlike in the usual bargaining models where
the issue is simply whether there will be agreement and if yes, under what terms, in the present
model there is a  wealth  of  qualitatively  different  equilibrium  configurations.  The 'types' of
equilibria are distinguished according to whether the bargainers agree (A), take their option(s)
(O) or wait for better future possibilities (D) in the four states. Of course, not all the 81 possible
combinations can arise in equilibrium. However, as shown in Figure 1, spanning the parameter-
space we can find seven different types of equilibria. The complexities of the equilibrium set are
not circumscribed to their differing types, though. Within each type we can further distinguish
qualitatively different equilibria (involving agreement),  depending on  the possible  credibility
configurations of the threats used to pin down an agreement.
4.1 4.3a 4.3b 4.3b 4.3b 4.2 4.2
ø ø A A D D D A D
ø x A A D D/ A A O O
xø A A A A A O O
xx A O O O O O O
Figure 1
The different actions in the states and the subsections that describe them
                                                
1 x denotes an available option, ø the absence of it. The first sign of the tuple refers to the proposer of the
period.4
It happens to be the  case that the most  useful  way to  span  the parameter-space  is
centering our attention on the size of the options, x. When the sum of the two options is less
than the potential gains from trade (normalized to one), we are in the usual type of equilibrium,
since the options will never be taken (and therefore waiting will not be optimal either). This type
of equilibria are characterized  in  Proposition  4.1.  Observe,  however,  that the case of  large
outside options, i.e. 2x  > 1, is no longer trivial. It is true that in state (x, x) no agreement can
give the players as much as the sum of their options and thus they must necessarily opt out.2
Nevertheless, in the rest of the states the equilibrium  behavior  is  not  pinned down by  this
condition. Whether the options are taken in the states where only one of the players has them
available depends on a different inequality. In this case we need to compare the sum of the
payoffs in case one of them takes the option with the available gains from trade. Let y denote the
expected gains of a player without an option when the opponent leaves to take the option. Then
there are gains from trade provided that  x + y < 1. When this inequality is not satisfied, in all
states but (ø, ø) the options will be taken and thus the only remaining question is whether in that
state they get to  an  agreement  or  prefer to  wait  for  the options  to  become  available  (see
Proposition 4.2). In the in between case, when x + y < 1 < 2x, the options will only be taken in
state (x, x). If x is relatively low, there will be agreement in the rest of the states (see Proposition
4.3a) if not there will be delay in some of them (see Proposition 4.3b). These delays, caused by
the players aspiration in waiting for very attractive outside options, are efficient. Equilibria do
not always yield the delays that are appropriate to ensure efficiency,  though.  In  fact,  if  the
probability  of future outside opportunities decreases after players see their opponent take the
option, then it is possible that exactly two equilibrium payoffs coexist: one  involves delay in
both states (ø, ø) and ( ø, x), the other involves delay only in state (ø, ø). In this latter case,
inefficiencies may be created by agreeing too early. 
Models of strategic bargaining with symmetric but imperfect information are very scarce.
Wolinsky [1987] presents a model of  bargaining  where  players enjoy symmetric  uncertain
outside opportunities: After a  proposal/response round  ends  in  rejection,  both  players may
search for outside opportunities. A player that finds an outside option may take it, or leave it to
return to another proposal/response round. Wolinsky’s bargaining model is richer than ours in
its consideration of the search for outside opportunities. Whereas in our model outside options
simply fall from heaven, in Wolinsky’s model players actively search for them, they decide the
intensity of their search, and pay its cost. On the other hand, his bargaining procedure is simpler
than ours in the strategic role played by outside options: since players do not have their outside
options available during the proposal/response rounds these opportunities never interfere with
the offer/response decisions of the players, and thus they are not used as a threat in bargaining.
Vislie [1988] adds uncertainty about the presence of a second potential worker in the model of
Shaked  and  Sutton  [1984]  and  derives  the  corresponding  unique  equilibrium.  Avery  and
                                                
2  Note that, whenever it is preferred to take the option to immediate agreement, it is also preferred to waiting.5
Zemsky [1994a] consider a model in which exogenous shocks affect the gains from trade. The
outcome of each shock is revealed after the proposer made her offer but before the responder's
move. Consequently, the responder can use this "private" information to reduce the proposer's
"first  mover"  advantage.  In  equilibrium,  the first  proposal  is  not  accepted  for  all  possible
realizations of the  shock  and  therefore  there will  be  delay with  positive  probability  before
agreement  occurs.  This  inefficiency  in  turn,  may  cause  multiple  equilibria,  and  hence
deterministic  delay,  according  to  the  Money  Burning  Principle  (see,  Avery  and  Zemsky
[1994b]). Finally, Merlo and Wilson [1995,1998] also analyze a stochastic model of sequential
bargaining, although they only consider the variability of the available surplus and do not allow
for (random) outside options. They also obtain equilibria where the players disagree in some
states of the world because they both expect to improve their shares in the future.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2  presents  the model. Sections 3  and  4
present  the  results  for  fixed  and  random  outside  options,  respectively.  Some  illustrative
examples are reviewed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.   
2. The model
Player 1 and Player 2 are bargaining over the division of a fixed surplus, normalized to one, in
an environment where outside opportunities arise at random during the process of bargaining.
We assume that the existence of outside opportunities in the future is uncertain while the value
of the options, whenever they are available, is common knowledge and equal to xi ³ 0 i =1,2.
Time is running in discrete, equidistant periods, numbered by the natural numbers. At each t, the
game is in one of four possible states: neither  player has  an  option,  state (ø, ø);  only  the
responder has an option, state (ø, x);  only the proposer has an option, state (x, ø); and both
players have an option, state (x, x). The random variable that governs outside opportunities is the
same for each period, while its realizations are independent across periods. Thus, Prob{both
players have the outside option at t} = a,  Prob{only Player i has the option at t} = bi, and
Prob{neither player has the option at t} = m,  a + b1 + b2 + m = 1,  for all t as long as no
player takes the outside option. The situation where both players have permanent options arises
when a = 1. The games without options  (Rubinstein [1982]) and with a permanent option for
one of the players (Shaked [1994]) arise when m = 1 and  b1 = 1, respectively.
The players discount future payoffs via the (common) discount factor d. In even (odd)
periods Player 1 (Player 2) makes an offer which the other party may accept, thus terminating
the game with agreement at the proposed shares, or upon rejection, either of the two parties may
take their outside option, provided that it is available. In this case, the opponent’s payoff is the
outside option if it is available or the discounted expected value of obtaining it later, otherwise.6
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where pi  denotes the probability that the option is available for i in any given period after j has
taken the option. In principle, the outside opportunities available to i after j takes her option may
remain constant, but they may also increase or decrease. Thus, pi  may be greater, smaller or
equal to  a + bi . If the offer is rejected but neither player opts out then bargaining goes on to
the following round. Observe that  we make no  assumptions  on  whether  the availability  of
outside  options  is  correlated  or  uncorrelated  between  players.  3  On  the  other  hand,  for
simplicity,  we ignore the possibility  of  serially  correlated  options  and  we impose that the
duration of options and offers to coincide.  
3. Permanent, two-sided outside options
A detailed analysis of the game with fixed and known options, i.e. a = 1, is in  Ponsatí  and
Sákovics [1998]. Here we only present a brief discussion of the results. Observe that, if the sum
of the two options  is  greater  than the surplus  to  be  divided,  the unique Nash  equilibrium
outcome is that players take their outside options in period zero. Basically, in such a case the
negotiation does not even begin, since in fact there are no "gains from trade." For the rest of this
section we assume that  x1 + x2 £ 1.
The key observation that drives the results in the game with a = 1 is that, when both
players can opt out after a rejection, the proposer can always keep the responder's share down to
the value of her outside option, independent  of the size of the options. We show this via the
following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Ponsatí and Sákovics [1998]) For any  0 £ x1 £ 1-x2 £ 1, immediate agreement at
(1-x2, x2) is an outcome that can be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof:  Consider the following strategies: if Player i is the proposer he always asks for 1-xj; the
responder accepts any proposal that is not worse than the (candidate) equilibrium proposal; if
the proposer asks for more, then the responder rejects and  takes her  outside option;  if  the
responder does not accept a proposal the proposer opts out. It is straightforward to verify that
these strategies constitute a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Q.E.D.
The intuition behind this result is easy to understand. Given that tomorrow's proposer is
assumed to have a large bargaining power, today's proposer is to expect little tomorrow and thus
his threat to take his option today is credible. When only one of the players has an option, such
a threat is not credible for low option values, since today's proposer can obtain a decent payoff
                                                
3 With perfectly correlated options, we have b = 0 and m = 1-a.  If the options are independent and they appear
with probability pi for  player i, then we have bi = pi (1- pj), a =  p1 p2   and  m = (1-p1) (1-p2).7
even when he is responder. This is so, because next period's proposer does not have an outside
option and therefore the responder has some  bargaining  power,  since she  controls whether
payoffs are to be discounted. When both players can opt out when they are  proposers, the
proposers can commit to opting out, thus depriving the responders of all their bargaining power
-- except for the one given to them by the outside option principle -- and in turn making each
other's commitment to opt out credible. Thus, the result in Lemma 1 depends exclusively on the
possibility for both players to opt out when they are proposers, the responders' opting out only
serves as "damage control," guaranteeing a minimum payoff to the second mover.
If the options of the players are of sufficiently high value then they must take  them
(upon a hypothetical rejection) in equilibrium and thus the equilibrium of Lemma 1 is the unique
SPE. Otherwise, we have multiple equilibria, which are sustained by a threat to switch to an
equilibrium  which  makes  the  proposer  indifferent  between  opting  out  and  continuing.4
Proposition 1 gives a complete characterization of the equilibria.
Proposition 3.1  (Ponsatí and Sákovics [1998] , with d2=d1 )
i) If   x1 £ d2(1- x2/d)  and x2 £ d2(1- x1/d),  all immediate efficient agreements that give Player
1 a payoff in [1-d(1-x1/d), 1-x2] can be supported as subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes.
Moreover , for any period t > 0, if the interval  [(1-d (1-x1/d))d-t, 1 - (1-d(1-x2/d))d(1-t)] is non-
empty, delayed agreements that give Player 1 a share in this interval and the remainder to Player
2, can also be supported as subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes.   
ii) Otherwise the equilibrium in Lemma 1 is the unique SPE.
Proof: See Ponsatí and Sákovics[1998].
4. Randomly available outside options
In this section we characterize ex-ante expected SPE payoffs when options appear randomly.
For simplicity, we focus on the symmetric case where  x1 = x2 = x and b1 = b2 = b. Thus, we
will  characterize  the intervals  of  ex-ante  expected  SPE  payoffs  of  the  first  proposer  and
responder, that is [vP, v P] and [vR, v R], respectively. Let  a = inf{a, such that a is the SPE
payoff of the proposer in a subgame starting in state (x, x)} and a = sup{a, such that a is the
SPE payoff of the proposer in a subgame starting in state (x, x)}. Defining (b, b ),  (c ,c) and
(d, d) analogously for states (x, ø), (ø, x) and (ø, ø), respectively we have that  
vP º a a + b(b + c) + m d ,
                                                
4 Note that we cannot use a more extreme threat (like holding the proposer down to his outside option next
period), since then he would simply opt out now. We are grateful to Margarida Corominas for this observation.8
and
v P º aa + b(b + c) + md.
The interval of payoffs to the responder [vR, v R], can be defined analogously.
4.1 When options are only used as threats
Let us first consider the case of relatively small, x < 1/2, outside options. Now the sum of the
payoffs of the players cannot exceed one in any state and in any equilibrium. Consequently, all
efficient5  equilibrium  payoffs  can  be  implemented  by  immediate  agreement  in  all  states,
implying that the responder always earns one minus the proposer's share (therefore,  in  this
subsection we drop the sub indices in vP and vR, and we write v to denote a generic SPE payoff
to the proposers in the first period, and we let  v and v to denote the bounds on the interval such
payoffs). The exact values of v and v,  depend on the strategic capabilities of each player in
each state, that in turn, depend on whether threats to take the option in absence of an agreement
are credible or not. This credibility is determined by the relative size of the option with respect to
the continuation values, that is, d(1-v) for the proposer and dv for the responder. If x is larger
than these values then opting out is a credible threat, otherwise not. The full characterization of
the set of SPE, requires that we completely explore the implications of each of the nine possible
credibility configurations:6
Case I:  x > d(1-v) and x > dv .
Case IIa:  d(1-v) £ x £ d(1-v)  and  dv £ x £ dv .
Case IIb:  x < d(1-v)  and  dv £ x £ dv .
Case IIc:  d(1-v) £ x £ d(1-v)  and  x < dv.
Case IId:  x < d(1-v)  and  x < dv.
Case IIIa:  x < d(1-v)  and  x > dv.
Case IIIb:  d(1-v) £ x £ d(1-v)  and  x > dv.
Case IVa: x > d(1-v)  and  x < dv.
Case IVb: x > d(1-v)  and  dv £ x £ dv .
Since this exploration is tedious and involved, we present it in the Appendix. Its result is
summed up in the following Proposition:
                                                
5 We refer to inefficient equilibria at the end of Section 4.
6 In Case I both players strictly prefer to take their options, whenever they can. In Case II neither of them has
such strict preference. In Case III only the responder, while in Case IV only the proposer wants to take her
option.9
Proposition 4.1  Let x < 1/2, then for each parameter configuration, the set of SPE involving
immediate agreement is fully characterized as follows:7
i) if  x Î [0, min{xIIa =
d(1-d)
1-d
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iii) if  x Î (x IIc,  xIIa),  then  v(x) = v(x) = 
1- a+bg ( )x
1+d(b+m)
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v) if  x Î (x IIa, min{x IVa =
d
1+d 1-b(1-g) ( )
, 1/2}),   then  v(x) = v(x) = 
1- a+bg ( )x
1+d(b+m)
,
vi) if  x Î [max{x IVa, x IIa}, 1/2),        then  v(x) =v(x) = 




Since the result is very sensitive to changes in the parameter values, we will later illustrate
it for some salient configurations in Section 5, together with the set of SPE outcomes for the
case of large outside options. However, there are a few things that we can remark, without the
scrutiny of the specific values. First, notice that some of the cases - namely, IIb, IIIa and IIIb -
never arise in equilibrium.8 This is not surprising, since in these cases it should be true that the
responder expects more than the proposer despite of the commitment value of being the first
mover.  Second,  again according  with  intuition,  for  sufficiently  small values  of  the outside
options they have no effect on the outcome and we obtain the Rubinstein result. For cases IIa
and IIc, we have multiple equilibria. These multiplicities are a consequence of Proposition 3.1
type results for IIa (where both players may or may not prefer to opt out), and Shaked's [1994]
                                                
7 With the convention that [a, b) = Æ if a ³ b .
8 IVb does arise for a single value of x.10
result (there, options can be taken by the proposer but only one of the players enjoys them, and
thus when the player with outside options acts as the proposer, a multiplicity of proposals can
be sustained in SPE). If the options are relatively high, we can find ourselves in Case I where
both players always want to opt out after a rejection, again yielding a unique outcome. For the
remaining values of x we find ourselves in Case IVa, where only the proposer prefers to take his
option. Since again, both players have strict preferences about  the opting out  decision,  this
equilibrium is also unique.
4.2 When options are always taken
Let us now turn to the case of large outside options (x+y >1). First, note that, whenever x > 1/2,
in state (x, x) the unique equilibrium outcome is taking up the options, since otherwise in the
continuation either there is agreement, in which case the sum of payoffs is one and therefore at
least one player would prefer to deviate and take up her option; or there is disagreement, in
which case (by discounting) it is strictly preferable to take the option now. In order to determine
the equilibrium behavior in the rest of the states a relevant question is whether x+y exceeds one




If x ³ q º
1
1+ g
, then in both states where one of the players has the option available,
she will take it. To see this, note that agreement is not possible in these states, since at least one
of the parties would prefer to refuse the deal, just as in state (x, x). By the same argument, any
future agreement is dominated. The only remaining possibility is to take the option later, but
then the player who has it today will strictly prefer to take it now. Thus, the only open question
is what happens in state (ø, ø). In this case, they will agree at 1-dvP, unless it is Pareto superior
to wait until next period. Waiting one period is not Pareto Superior if the discounted expected
gains of proposer plus the discounted expected gains of the responder do not exceed 1, the
current  sum of proposer plus responder  payoffs , that is, vP + vR = 2ax + 2b(x+y) + m d (vP
+ vR) £ 1/d –– or, equivalentlyx £ z º
1-dm
2d(a + b(1+ g))
.
Proposition 4.2  Let  x ³ q º
1
1+ g
. Then for each parameter configuration, the set of SPE is
fully characterized as follows:
i) if  x < z º
1-dm
2d a+b(1+g) ( )




   and   vR(x) = 
dm
2 + a+b(1+ g) ( )(1+ 2dm)x
1+dm
;11
ii) if x ³ z, then the unique equilibrium yields  





The results  of  the proposition are  quite  intuitive.  Note  that  z  is  decreasing  in  a, b,  g,  
and d. That is, waiting is more likely if either the players are more patient or the options are
more likely to appear. When they do wait in equilibrium, the expected payoffs of proposer and
responder are the same, since they never get to agreement and thus the first-mover advantage
disappears.
4.3  When the options are only taken if they are available simultaneously
Let us now consider the case  x < q º
1
1+ g
 , where x+y is less than one. Now, in the state
where only the proposer can opt out, agreement must be immediate in equilibrium. To prove
this, we show that the proposer's option always exceeds her continuation value (and hence she
obtains the full surplus net of y). First, observe that the sum of the expected payoffs of the
bargainers cannot exceed 2x in any state and, therefore, it can never exceed this value. Now, if
the proposer's threat to take her option were not credible it should be the case that she expects at
least x/d next period (as a responder). But this would imply that her opponent -- as a proposer -
- expects no more than  2x - x/d  = 
2d -1
d
x < x < x/d, contradicting the fact that, ex-ante, the
proposer  never  expects less  than the responder  in  equilibrium.  Moreover,  observe  that  if
agreement is delayed in state (ø, x), then the option cannot be credible and therefore in state (ø,
ø) agreement is delayed too. Therefore, delay can be avoided if and only if  vP + vR = 2ax + 2b
+  md(vP  +  vR)  £  1/d,  or, equivalently,  x £ u º
1-d ( )+da
2da
.  Therefore  if  x  < min{q,  u},
agreement is always reached in states (ø, ø), (ø, x) and (x, ø). In state (ø, ø) they agree at 1-dvP
and in state (ø, x) at 1-max{dvP, x}. Finally, in state (x, ø) the proposer obtains 1-y.







the set of SPE with immediate agreement  (except  in  state (x,  x))  is  fully  characterized as
follows:
i) If  x < x 
  
º
d 1- a ( )
1+ d m - a +b( 1+ g) ( )




   and   vR(x) = 
d(b+m)(1-a)+ a+bg +2da(b+m) ( )x
1+d(b+m)
;12
ii) if  
  
x º
d 1- a ( )
1+ d m + a - b 1+ g ( ) ( )
 > x, then for  x Î [x., x], there is an interval of equilibria
that yield payoffs to the proposer in  [vP(x), v P(x)]  with
vP(x) =
  
x a - bg ( ) + 1- a ( ) 1- d b + m ( ) ( ) + db b + m ( )x




x a - bg ( ) + 1- a ( ) 1- dm ( ) - bx
1- d2m b + m ( )
;




   and   vR(x) = 
dm(1-a)+ a+b(1+g)+2dam ( )x
1+dm
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
This result is very much in the spirit of Shaked [1994]. If the option is relatively small the
equilibrium is unique, since in the only state where the outcome is not yet determined it does not
affect the outcome.9 If the option is relatively large we have again a unique equilibrium , since
now the option will become a credible threat. For the in between values, the credibility of the
threat to opt out is indeterminate, so we have multiple  equilibria.  Let us  next analyze  what
happens if delay is possible:
Proposition  4.3b  Assume  that  u º
1-d ( )+da
2da
  £  x  <  q º
1
1+g




2-d a-b(1+ g)+dm a+b(1+ g) ( ) [ ]
 and w' º 
bd
1-d
2(b+m)1-b(1- g) ( )-d(a-bg)
.
Then the following holds:
i) If  u < x < min{w,w'} there is a unique SPE. For all t, delay occurs in (ø, ø) and (ø,
x), agreement where the proposer obtains 1-y occurs in state (x, ø) and the players disagree
and take the options in (x, x).
ii) If w < x < w’, the above SPE coexists with a SPE where for all t, delay occurs in (ø,
ø), agreement occurs in (x, ø) and (ø, x) where the proposer obtains 1-y and 1-x, respectively,
and the players disagree and take the options in (x, x).
iii) If x > max{w,w'}, the second equilibrium in  ii) is the unique SPE.
                                                
9 The equilibrium payoffs still depend on x since in other states it matters.13
Proof: Following the previous  discussion,  the only  open  question is  whether  agreement  is
delayed or not in state (ø, x). This decision corresponds to the responder, since he has  the
option. The comparison he makes is whether her continuation value exceeds the value of her
option. Since the responder's continuation value is the proposer's ex-ante profit (discounted) we
start by deriving an upper bound on vP. The first thing to note is that, given that x ³ u, the
proposer would always prefer to delay in state (ø, x). To see this, recall that x ³ u implies that
d(vR+vP) ³ 1. Now, if x > dvR -- and therefore the responder forces agreement at (1-x,x) -- we
have 1-x < 1-dvR £ dvP. Given this, we can write the upper bound on the proposer's equilibrium
payoff as
v P = ax + b(1-y) + (b+m)dv R.
The upper bound on the responder's payoff is determined only implicitly:
v R = ax + by + mdv P +bmax{x, dv P}.
Resolving this system case by case, we obtain that
v  P =






,ifx < ¢  w 











Since delay can only occur when the proposers value is at least 
x
d
, we have proved that if x £ w'
then there exists an equilibrium where delay occurs in both state (ø, ø) and (ø, x) every period,
with the payoff stated in the proposition. In addition we have also established that if x > w' the
only candidate for equilibrium is agreement in state (ø, x) in every period.
Now, assume that the equilibrium prescribes delay in state (ø, x) in periods t and t+1.
Note that by the previous paragraph this implies that  x £ w'. We claim that this implies that  in
equilibrium they wait in period t-1 also. To see this, observe that
vtP = ax + b(1-y) + (b+m)dvt+1R = ax + b(1-y) + (b+m)d(ax+ by + (b+m)dvt+2P).
Given that  the responder chooses to wait in period t+1 we know that dvt+2P ³ x. Therefore we
have that
 vtP ³  ax + b(1-y) + (b+m)d(ax+ by + (b+m)dx).
Since the RHS is greater than x/d if and only if w' is greater than x (what we assumed), we have
that in period t-1 the responder will prefer to wait, as claimed.14
Next, assume that the equilibrium prescribes agreement in state (ø, x) in periods t and t+1. We
claim that this implies that, if x > w, in equilibrium they agree in period t-1 too. To see this,
observe that  
vtP = ax + b(2-x-y) + mdvt+1R = ax + b(2-x-y) + md(ax+ b(x+y) + mdvt+2P).
Given that  the responder chooses to agree in period t+1 we know that dvt+2P £ x. Therefore we
have that
 vtP £  ax + b(2-x-y) + md(ax+ b(x+y) + mdx).
Since the RHS is less than x/d if and only if w is less than x, we have that for x > w, in period t-
1 the responder will prefer to agree, as claimed.
The last two results imply that when x is between w and w', the only possible equilibrium beside
the two stationary ones is one where after some T, depending on the identity of the proposer
they agree or delay in state (ø, x). Observe that in this candidate for equilibrium we have that
(past T) vp
t = vp
t+2 . Let t be a period where they agree. Then we have that
 vp





a-b1+g ( )+md a +bg ( ) [ ]x+2b
1-m(b+m)d
2 .
Since  in  period  t+1  they  disagree  by  assumption,  it  must  be  the  case  that  dvp
t ³ x.
Straightforward calculations show that this is equivalent to the condition  x £ w.
Carrying out the same exercise for period t+1, we obtain,
vp





a-bg +(b+m) d a+b(1+ g) ( ) [ ]x +b
1-m(b+m)d
2 .
Since in period t they agree by assumption, it must be the case that dvp
t+1 £ x. Straightforward
calculations show that this is equivalent to the condition  x ³ w'.
Routine calculations show that u £ w implies w < w' and therefore we cannot have for x
³  u  that   w' £  x  £  w.  Consequently  the  strategies  under  scrutiny  cannot  constitute  an
equilibrium.15
All we have left to prove is that, for u £ x < w, we have only the stationary equilibrium
involving delay in state (ø, x) in every period. We will prove this by contradiction. If  there
existed a different equilibrium, it necessarily would involve agreement in state (ø, x) in some
period. Note that this would imply that there is some continuation payoff which does not exceed
the option's  value:  x  ³  dvP.  Given  this  inequality  we can  write  the  lower  bound  on  the
responder's value as
vR = (a+b)x + by +  mdvP.
The lower bound for the proposer's value is not as straightforward, since it depends on the
responder's decision. We have that,
vP £ a x + b(1-y) + mdvR + b min{1-x, dvR}.
Analyzing both cases we obtain that a necessary condition for the existence of the candidate
equilibrium is that  x ³ min{w,w'} which given u £ x is equivalent to x ³ w.
Q.E.D.
Note  that,  if  the outside  opportunities  of  players  increase  or  remain  constant  when  their
opponent takes the option (that is,  p  ³  a+b )  then q  < u  and  therefore  the  scenario  of
Proposition 4.3b does not arise. A typical scenario for the case with low p, is one where there
are few outside options in the economy and therefore if one is taken the probability that there
will be another one available decreases sharply.
Propositions 4.1,  4.2, 4.3a  and  4.3b  give  a  characterization  of  the set  of  equilibria
without unnecessary delay. In addition, we also have inefficient equilibria, where the delay is
sustained by mutual threats of "regime switching", not by the expectation  of  a  high  valued
option. These equilibria are a standard consequence in (stationary) strategic bargaining models,
whenever there exist multiple efficient equilibria (see, for example, Avery and Zemsky [1994b]).
Whenever we have multiple equilibria with immediate agreement, delayed agreements can be
constructed in the usual way.
5. Examples
The following examples, focusing on  some especially relevant particular cases, should facilitate
the reading  and interpretation of our results:
Perfectly patient players: Consider the asymptotic properties of our model as d ® 1.
A) p = a + b16
Taking the limit we obtain that xIIa ® 0 , and x  IIa , q, z® 1/2, so that we have
i) if  x Î [0, 1/2], then we are in case iv of Proposition 4.1  and thus [v(x), v (x)] = [x,1-
x],
ii) if  x > 1/2, then we are in case ii of Proposition 4.3 and thus v(x) = x.
Since in the limit the value of commitment is zero, any agreement is possible which gives both
players at least their option.
B) p = 0
Taking the limit we obtain that xIIa ® 0 , z ® 1/2 ,  x  IIa ® 
a+2b
2a+3 b
 and, assuming b > 0,10 we
have that:
i) if  x Î [0, 1/2), then  [v, v] = [vIIa(x),v IIa(x)],
ii) If  x Î [1/2, 
2
3+m ), then there is a unique equilibrium with delay in states (ø, ø) and
(ø, x),





1+m +b ], the equilibrium with delay in states (ø, ø) and (ø, x)
coexists with the equilibrium with delay only in state  (ø, ø),
iv) if  x Î (
1
1+m +b
, 1], then the equilibrium with delay only in state (ø, ø) is unique.
Perfectly correlated, equally likely options:











 < xIIa= 
d
1+d




 q = 
2 -d
2










Therefore we have the following:









                                                
10 If b = 0, then (II), (III) and (IV) collapse into (IV) for x Î [1/2, 1].
11 The qualitative features of the set of SPE outcomes are robust to changes in p.17










), then  [v(x), v(x)] = [




























v) if  x Î [
2-d
2d
, 1], then there is the unique equilibrium with vP(x) = vR(x) =
x
2 -d.
The following figure illustrates the case d = .9:
Figure 2
Player 1's payoffs with perfectly correlated and equally likely  options (d = .9)
6. Final remarks
As we have seen, the set of equilibria is very sensitive to changes in the parameters. Nevertheless
some general features can be identified. For example, it can be shown that for very low and very
high values of the options the equilibrium is generically unique. As shown in Shaked [1994]
and in Ponsatí and Sákovics [1998], multiplicity of equilibria arises if the proposer can be made
indifferent between opting out and continuing to the next period upon rejection of her offer. In
the present case, if x is small then opting out is (strictly) not credible for almost all the values of
the parameters (unless d = 1) and we obtain the Rubinstein solution (c.f. the Outside Option18
Principle). If x is large, the proposer's option is  (strictly)  credible  for  all parameter  values,
yielding uniqueness again. On the other hand, for  any  given  parameter  configuration,  there
always exists an interval of option values, for which there are multiple equilibria. This is so
because the necessary conditions for the  existence  of  Case  IIc  are always  satisfied for  an
interval of x and the only possibility for these conditions not to be sufficient is that Case IIa
invades this territory yielding an even larger set of equilibria. An additional curiosity -- that can
be seen on Figure 2 -- is that the expected equilibrium share of the player to make the first offer
is not necessarily increasing in the value of the options. This phenomenon actually has a simple
explanation. When the equilibrium is such that  only  the proposer's  threat  of  opting out  is
credible, the value of the options only enters her payoff directly in case (x, x), where it provides
the value for the responder's payoff (c.f. Case IVa ).
Proposition  4.3b  is  a  result of  some  theoretical  interest  on  its  own right. The co-
existence  of  exactly  two  equilibrium  payoffs  in  an  alternating  offer  bargaining  game  is
absolutely  novel.  Usually,  the in-between  values  can also  be  supported  (by  non-stationary
strategies). In the current scenario, however, only stationary strategies exist, because in three of
the states, the players have a strictly dominant strategy, while in the fourth state the necessary
conditions for equilibrium impose stationarity.
Efficiency, or the lack of it, is an important characteristic of  equilibria  in  bargaining
games. In the context of outside opportunities it is not straightforward how to define it, though.
Whether the outside opportunities are considered as potential gains to be realized (with some
third  economic  agent)  or  they  are  already  sunk  and  accounted  for  makes  an  important
difference. For simplicity, let us evaluate our results using the latter criterion: therefore using a
social welfare function which simply sums the payoffs of our two bargainers. The first thing to
observe is that whenever they take their outside options in equilibrium (even if only one of them
takes this decision) it is efficient to do so. Since every agreement is also efficient in the sense
that they share  the  entire  surplus,  inefficiencies  can  only  come  about  via  the  timing  of
agreement. As always, we have the inefficient equilibria generated by reversion to the extreme
equilibria,12 which entail delay (at least, with positive probability). However, not all equilibria
which entail delay in some of the states are inefficient, since in the present context, the expected
joint surplus may be maximized by waiting for the availability of the options. On the other hand,
by the same token inefficiency may be caused by an agreement which is premature. Under the
parameter configurations where in the periods where neither player has an option they delay
agreement but in the state where only the responder has one they agree (see Proposition 4.3b),
some surplus is wasted. The reason why this happens is clear: the responder can force a deal
which for him is better than his continuation value, but his gains do not compensate for the
proposer's losses.
                                                
12 Whenever there are multiple equilibria with immediate agreement.19
In spite of the uncertainty about future options, our bargaining environment is stationary,
and this is crucial for our results. Yet, in many cases outside options arise and cease to be
available over time in changing, non-stationary, environments. We address the role of options of
uncertain value  in  non-stationary  bargaining  environments  in  Ponsatí  and  Sákovics  [1999],
where we have argued (among other things) that: i) the relevant attribute of an uncertain outside
option is the time by which its value is revealed rather than the time up to which it is available; ii)
the possibility of continuing bargaining after the  option's  value  has  become  known has  an
option value13 which biases the ex-ante valuation of the outside option upwards.
References
Avery,  C.,  and  Zemsky,  P.  (1994a)  "Option  Values  and  Bargaining  Delays,"  Games  and
Economic Behavior 7, 139-153.
Avery, C., and Zemsky, P. (1994b) "Money Burning and Multiple Equilibria in Bargaining,"
Games and Economic Behavior 7, 154-168.
Merlo, A. and Wilson, C., (1995) "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete
Information," Econometrica 63, 371-399.
Merlo, A. and Wilson, C., (1998) "Efficient  Delays  in  a  Stochastic  Model  of  Bargaining,"
Economic Theory 11, 39-55.
Osborne, M., and Rubinstein, A. (1990) Bargaining and markets  Academic Press, San Diego.
Ponsatí, C., and Sákovics, J. (1998) "Rubinstein Bargaining with Two-Sided Outside Options,"
Economic Theory 11, 667-672.
Ponsatí, C., and Sákovics, J. (1999) “Bargaining in a Changing Environment” in Alkan, A.,
C.D. Alipranits and N.C. Yannelis Current trends in Economics:Theory and Applications,
Springer-Verlag series Studies in Economic Theory, 9, 389-404.
Rubinstein, A., (1982) "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica 50, 97-109.
Shaked,  A.,  (1994)  "Opting  Out:  Bazaars  versus  'Hi  Tech'  Markets,"  Investigaciones
Económicas 18(3), 421-432.
Shaked, A. and Sutton, J., (1984) "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a
Bargaining Model," Econometrica  52, 1351-1364.
                                                
13 As in futures markets.20
Vislie, J., (1988) "Equilibrium in A Market with Sequential Bargaining and Random Outside
Options," Economics Letters 27, 325-328.
Wolinsky, A., (1987) "Matching, Search and Bargaining" Journal of Economic Theory 42, 311-
333.21
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.1: We must explore cases I to IVb. Note that, in principle, for each
parameter configuration, several cases (i.e. several types of equilibria) may coexist. Let us start
by the analysis of the first case:
Case I: Note, that for both players, regardless of whether they are proposer or responder,
taking the outside option is not only a credible threat but it is a strictly dominant action in case
they do not reach agreement in a given period. Thus, in state (x, ø), the responder must accept all
offers that give him more than y (the expected value that the players get when their opponent
takes the option at a state in which they do not have  one),  while  he  is  indifferent  between
accepting or rejecting y. Consequently, the unique possible equilibrium demand of the proposer
is 1-y. Similarly, in states (ø, x) and (x, x), the responder will take the outside option if the
proposer demands more than 1-x. At the same time, it is not credible that he would reject any
other proposal (x > dv), so agreement at  1-x  is  the unique possible  equilibrium  outcome.
Finally, in state (ø, ø), since no player can take an outside option, payoffs for the proposer must
lie in [1-dv, 1-dv], just as in the original Rubinstein game. Therefore, conditional on being in
case I, the following two equalities must hold:  
 v = (a+b)(1-x) + b(1-y) + m(1-dv),
 v = (a+b)(1-x) +  b(1-y) + m(1-dv ).
Hence  v = v = vI = 
1- a+b ( )x-by
1+dm
=
1- a+b(1+ g) ( )x
1+dm
. Substituting in the inequalities that
define Case I, we obtain that the relevant one is the second, and thus this equilibrium exists if
x > xI =
d
1+d 1-(1-g)b ( )
. Note however, that this does not imply that we have characterized a
unique equilibrium for all x satisfying the inequality. It may well be the case that for the same
parameter  values  we can satisfy  the necessary conditions of  a  different  case,  resulting  in
additional equilibria.
Case IIa: Note that now all kinds of credibility combinations are possible. The worst
case scenario for the proposer, which gives rise to the payoff v, is 1-dv  in all states, since x £
dv , and thus when the proposer does not take her option the responder does not take it either,
resulting in the Rubinstein continuation values.
For the upper bound, it is straightforward to see that the proposer can obtain up to 1-y
and 1-x in states (x, ø) and (x, x), respectively. Since x > dv for some v, by the Outside Option22
Principle, the proposer can obtain up to  1-x  in state (ø, x). Finally, when neither option is
available, the maximum the proposer can get is 1-dv. Therefore, we have that
  v = 1 - dv,
 v  = (a+b)(1-x) + b(1-y) + m(1-dv ).
Hence  v  = vIIa(x) = 




1-d 1-(a+b(1+ g))x ( )
1-d
2m









Remark:  Observe that in  this  case,  since the relevant  inequalities  may  go  either  way,  by
construction, we have the largest possible set of potential equilibrium values for every x.
To check the consistency of the equilibrium values with the inequalities defining this
case, note that, as it can directly be seen from the equality defining v,  vIIa(x) + v IIa(x)  > 1, and
thus the relevant (that is, most stringent) inequalities to verify are dvIIa(x) £ x and x £ d(1-










2 a+b(1+ g)-m ( )
=x  IIa
.
As a  consequence  of  the Remark above,  whenever  x  lies in  the above  interval,  the set  of
equilibrium payoffs is [vIIa(x), v IIa(x)].
To investigate what happens if x is outside that interval, assume that  x < xIIa= dvIIa  first.
If  x < xIIa then, by the maximality property of the bounds of case IIa (as mentioned in the
Remark above, case IIa yields the minimal possible equilibrium values for every x), thus x <
dvIIa(x) implies  x < dvI(x),  x < dvIIb(x), x < dvIIIb(x) and x < dvIVb(x), contradicting the second
inequality in cases I, IIb, IIIa, IIIb and IVb. Case IIc remains a candidate.
Case IIc: The corresponding equalities for the equilibrium bounds can easily be shown to be the
following:
vIIc = 1 - dv IIc,
 v IIc = a(1-x) + b(1-y) + (b+m)(1-dvIIc ).23
Solving  the system,  we obtain vIIc  = 
1-d 1-ax-by ( )
1-d
2 b+m ( )
=
1-d 1-(a+bg)x ( )
1-d
2 b+ m ( )
  and  v IIc  =
1-ax-by-d b+m ( )
1-d
2 b+m ( )
=
1-(a+bg)x -d b+m ( )
1-d
2 b+m ( )
. Given that  x  < xIIa  =  dvIIa, x  < dvIIc  is
guaranteed, again by the extreme limits of case IIa. Therefore, the necessary conditions for the














Now,  observe  that  these  conditions  are  also  sufficient,  since  the  possible  credibility
configurations of the two remaining cases (IId and IVa) are a subset of those of case IIc.
If x < xIIc , we are left with case IId only, since case IVa would require x > d(1-vIVa) ³
d(1-v IIc).








, which is guaranteed
whenever x £ xIIc  (<
d
2
1+d ), as assumed.
If  xIIa > x >  x  IIc (>
d
2
1+d )  the necessary condition for case IId is violated, so our
unique candidate case is IVa.
Case IVa: The corresponding equalities are
v = a(1-x) + b(1-y)+ (b+m)(1-dv),
 v = a(1-x) + b(1-y)+ (b+m)(1-dv ).




1- a+bg ( )x
1+d(b+m)





1+d b(1- g) +m-a ( )<x<
d
1+d 1-b(1-g) ( )
=x  IVa
 .
It  is  straightforward  to  verify  that  xIVa £ x  IIc  and  xIIa £ x  IVa   and  therefore  the  necessary
conditions are also sufficient.24
It remains to be seen what happens if  x > x  IIa . By the extremal property of the limits of
case IIa, we can directly discard all subcases of Cases II and III. A remaining candidate is case
IVb.
Case IVb: The corresponding equalities are
v  = a(1-x) + b(1-y) + (b+m)(1-dv),
 v = (a+b)(1-x) + b(1-y) + m(1-dv ).
Hence,    vIVb  = 
1-ax-by-d(b+m)1-(a+b)x -by ( )
1-d
2(b+m)m
    and    v IVb    =
1- (a+b)x-by-dm 1-ax-by ( )
1-d
2(b+m)m
.  Checking the necessary conditions for existence, dvIVb £
x £ dv IVb we obtain that this equilibrium may only exist at a single point:
xIVb = x  IVb =
d
1+d 1-b(1-g) ( ).
Note that at this point the equilibrium value is unique and equals  vIVb = 
1
1+d 1-b(1-g) ( )
.
The remaining necessary condition, x > d(1-vIVb), is easily seen to be satisfied at this point.
As we have seen before, xIVb is the border between the region for the equilibria of cases IVa and
I, whose value at xIVb is also  
1
1+d 1-b(1-g) ( )
. 
Thus we have provided complete characterization of the subgame-perfect equilibria with
immediate agreement for x < 1/2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.3a: When x lies in [1/2, u]  all efficient  equilibrium  payoffs  can be
implemented by immediate agreement in all states other that (x, x). Recall that in state (x, ø) the
proposer obtains 1-y, in state (x, x) both players  take their respective  options  and  that the
proposer's payoffs are in [1-dv P, 1-dvP]  in state (ø, ø). The exact values of vP, v P, vR and  v R
depend on  the strategic  capabilities  of  the  proposer  in  state  (ø,  x).  These  are  implicitly
determined by whether dvP £ x < dv P, x < dvP or x ³ dv P. Thus, just as in our characterization
for outside options x <1/2,  we need to check one by one each of these three cases.
Case I: If dvP £ x < dv P the proposer's payoffs in state (ø, x) are in [1-dv P, 1-x]. Therefore,25
vP = a x + b(1-y) + (b+m) (1-dv P),




ax + b 2 - y ( ) + m ( ) 1- d b + m ( ) ( ) + db b + m ( )x
1- d2m b + m ( )
,
vP = 
ax+b 2-y ( )+m ( )1-dm ( )-bx
1-d
2m b+m ( ) .
The necessary conditions for dvP £ x < dv P are
 x < 
  
x º
d 1- a ( )
1+ d m + a - b 1+ g ( ) ( )
,
x ³ x 
  
º
d 1- a ( )
1+ d m - a +b( 1+ g) ( )
,
Again, just as in the x < 1/2 case, we can see that this is the case with the largest feasible set of
equilibria and thus the conditions are also sufficient, as long as x < u.
Case II: If x ³ dv P the proposer's payoffs in state (ø, x) are 1-x. Therefore,
vP = a x + b(1-y) + b(1-x) + m (1-dv P),
v P = a x + b(1-y) + b(1-x) + m (1-dv P).
This yields a unique solution
vP = v P=
  
x a - b(1+ g) ( ) + 1- a
1+ dm .
Verifying the necessary condition yields x > x.
Case III: If x < dvP the proposer's payoffs in state (ø, x) are in [1-dv P, 1-dvP] .Therefore,
vP = a x + b(1-y) + (b+m) (1-dv P),
v P = a x + b(1-y) + (b+m) (1-dv P).26
This yields a unique solution
vP = v P=
  
x a - bg ( ) + 1- a
1- d(b + m) .
Verifying the necessary condition yields x > x.
Q.E.D.